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THE IMPACT OF THIRD-PARTY FINANCING ON TRANSNATIONAL 
LITIGATION  
Cassandra Burke Robertson 
Third-party litigation finance is a growing industry. The practice, 
also termed “litigation lending,” allows funders with no other connection to 
the lawsuit to invest in a plaintiff’s claim in exchange for a share of the ul-
timate recovery. Most funding agreements have focused on domestic litiga-
tion in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. However, the 
industry is poised for growth worldwide, and the recent environmental law-
suit brought by Ecuadorian plaintiffs against Chevron demonstrates that 
litigation funding is also beginning to play a role in transnational litigation.  
This article, prepared for a symposium on “International Law in 
Crisis,” speculates about how the growing litigation-finance industry may 
reshape transnational litigation in the coming decades. It argues that the 
individual economic incentives created by third-party financing will likely 
increase the number of transnational lawsuits filed, raise the settlement 
values of those lawsuits, and spread out the lawsuits among a larger num-
ber of countries than was typical in the past. It further hypothesizes that 
these individual choices about transnational litigation will lead countries to 
reassess their internal balance of litigation and regulation and will create 
pressure for greater international coordination of litigation procedure, in-
cluding transnational forum choice and cross-border judgment enforce-
ment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  Associate Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. This article was 
inspired in part by discussions at the “Evolution or Revolution? American Civil Procedure in 
the 21st Century” roundtable at the 2011 Southeastern Association of Law Schools Annual 
Conference, including Richard Freer’s presentation of the Ecuadorian funding agreement and 
related issues in third-party financing, Dustin Buehler’s discussion of economic incentives in 
litigation, and Donald Childress’s discussion of recent trends in transnational litigation. Lau-
rie Blank, Thomas Robertson, Steven M. Schneebaum, and Christopher A. Whytock also 
provided valuable input on earlier drafts of this article.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The long-running environmental litigation between the Ecuadorian 
residents of the Amazon region and Chevron/Texaco has spawned multiple 
adjudicatory proceedings in several countries,1 a host of scholarly commen-
tary,2 a documentary film sympathetic to the plaintiffs3 and another film 
  
 1 See Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 300–04 (2d Cir. 2011) (summarizing the 
initial litigation in the United States, subsequent litigation in Ecuador, including both civil 
and criminal actions, a related arbitration proceeding, and an action to enjoin the arbitration). 
There are also appellate proceedings in the Ecuadorian civil action and a simultaneous action 
in the United States to preclude enforcement of the Ecuadorian judgment. See Christopher A. 
Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens and the Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1444 (2011). 
 2 See generally Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1 (examining the interaction of the 
forum non conveniens and judgment enforcement doctrines); Cassandra Burke Robertson, 
Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081 (2010) (encouraging 
a more coherent process to provide foreign plaintiffs access to courts); Lucien J. Dhooge, 
Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco: Discretionary Grounds for the Non-Recognition of Foreign 
Judgments for Environmental Injury in the United States, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 295 (2010) 
(noting Chevron will not be able to escape this law suit without any consequences); Cor-
telyou Kenney, Disaster in the Amazon: Dodging “Boomerang Suits” in Transnational 
Human Rights Litigation, 97 CAL. L. REV. 857, 858–63 (2009) (using the Chevron case as 
examples to show the current movement in corporate responsibility and international litiga-
tion procedure); Judith Kimerling, Indigenous Peoples and the Oil Frontier in Amazonia: 
The Case of Ecuador, ChevronTexaco, and Aguinda v. Texaco, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
413, 474–84 (2006) (describing the suit that was originally filed against ChevronTexaco in 
New York); Jason Burke, Comment, Defining Investor Confidence: Avoiding Interpretive 
Uncertainty in Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 463 (2011) (exam-
ining investment treaty arbitration); Jonathan C. Drimmer, Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Global-
ly, Sue Locally: Trends and Out-of-Court Tactics in Transnational Tort Actions, 29 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 456 (2011) (using the Chevron case as a case study to describe tactics 
used by the plaintiffs in litigation). 
 3 See CRUDE: THE REAL PRICE OF OIL (Entendre Films 2009) (stressing Chevron’s hold on 
Ecuador and the lack of accountability to the Ecuadorian people). 
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commissioned by the defense,4 as well as hidden-camera videos allegedly 
revealing wrongdoing by plaintiffs’ counsel.5 The drama of the Ecuadorian 
case is in many ways sui generis. Nevertheless, various aspects of the case 
have been useful in highlighting emerging trends in transnational litigation, 
and the high-profile nature of the case has drawn attention to doctrinal intri-
cacies and litigation strategies that have become increasingly important in 
transnational cases.6 One such emerging trend highlighted by the Ecuadori-
an litigation is the convergence of transnational forum choice and related 
litigation strategies with third-party litigation financing.7  
Historically, the U.S. has been a “magnet forum” for transnational 
cases, as it permits broad discovery and contingent-fee representation, and it 
offers relatively high damage awards.8 U.S. courts have relied on the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens to discourage litigation of cases arising 
abroad that could be tried elsewhere. In the past, it was rare for such cases 
to be filed abroad after dismissal from the U.S.9 In recent years, however, a 
number of other countries—especially those in Latin America—have taken 
steps to make it easier for plaintiffs to file those cases in the plaintiffs’ home 
forums, and more cases have been tried to verdict abroad.10  
  
 4 See Chevron Corp., 629 F.3d at 309 n. 6 (noting that Chevron has commissioned a 
documentary to provide “its point of view” of the litigation). 
 5 See TexacoEcuador, Meeting 1, Complete Video, Judge Nunez Misconduct, Chevron 
Ecuador Lawsuit, YOUTUBE (Aug. 31, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/texacoecuador#p/c/ 
29615E4852842C4B/0/A8E-M0j2o-I. 
 6 See, e.g., Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1; Robertson, supra note 2. 
 7 See, e.g., Roger Parloff, Have You Got A Piece Of This Lawsuit?, FORTUNE (June 28, 
2011), available at http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2011/06/28/have-you-got-a-piece-
of-this-lawsuit-2/. 
 8 Robertson, supra note 2, at 1087–94; Russell J. Weintraub, International Litigation and 
Forum Non Conveniens, 29 TEX. INT’L L.J. 321, 352 (1994) (“The United States is a magnet 
forum for the afflicted of the world.”); Russell J. Weintraub, The United States as a Magnet 
Forum and What, if Anything, to do About it, in INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE 
REGULATION OF FORUM SELECTION 213 (Jack L. Goldsmith ed., 1997); but see Christopher A. 
Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481, 529 (2011) 
(“[T]he decline of alienage litigation raises substantial doubts about the claim that the United 
States is experiencing a transnational litigation explosion.”). 
 9 See David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: “A Rather 
Fantastic Fiction,” 103 L.Q. REV. 398, 418–20 (1987) (noting plaintiffs will run out of re-
sources before they can reinstitute the proceeding in the United States). 
 10 See Henry Saint Dahl, Forum Non Conveniens, Latin America and Blocking Statutes, 35 
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 21, 21 (2003) (discussing Latin America’s blocking statues); 
Winston Anderson, Forum Non Conveniens Checkmated? – The Emergence of Retaliatory 
Legislation, 10 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 183, 184 (2001) (noting Delgado v. Shell Oil as 
the high watermark for the forum non conveniens doctrine because of new legislative action); 
Paul Santoyo, Comment, Bananas of Wrath: How Nicaragua May Have Dealt Forum Non 
Conveniens a Fatal Blow Removing the Doctrine as an Obstacle to Achieving Corporate 
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Also in the last decade, a number of countries have loosened re-
strictions on third-party financing of litigation.11 Such financing typically 
encompasses “third parties—with no previous connection to a claimhold-
er—investing in a claimholder’s litigation, covering all his litigation costs in 
exchange for a share of any proceeds if the suit is successful, or, in the al-
ternative, nothing if the case is lost.”12 Australia and the U.K. have been 
leaders in this regard, but other countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Germany and South Africa have also liberalized lawsuit financing.13 More 
often than not, the cases financed are still purely domestic.14 Increasingly, 
however, third-party financing operates transnationally, and multinational 
financing companies may fund litigation across a number of countries.15  
  
Accountability, 27 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 703, 724–26, 735–36 (2005) (discussing Latin Ameri-
ca’s anti-forum non conveniens legislation). 
 11 Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime Industry that Has a Place 
in the United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83, 107 (2008). 
 12 Marco de Morpurgo, A Comparative Legal and Economic Approach to Third-Party 
Litigation Funding, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 343, 347 (2011); see also Fausone v. 
U.S. Claims, Inc., 915 So. 2d 626, 628 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (providing an example of a 
litigant in a product liability action who, through a litigation loan, sold interest in her law-
suit). Occasionally, funding contracts may call for repayment in excess of the amount recov-
ered. See A.B.A COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, WHITE PAPER ON ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION 
FINANCE 29 (2011) (describing how a plaintiff may hesitate to accept reasonable settlements 
due to his/her obligation to repay litigation loans). 
 13 See Martin, supra note 11, at 107 (“[M]any countries including the UK, Australia, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and South Africa have become more amenable to third 
parties financing lawsuits, typically on a contingency basis.”); de Morpurgo, supra note 12, 
at 360 (“Third-party litigation funding started to develop in Australia at the beginning of the 
1990s and soon spread over the rest of the common law world (United States, United King-
dom, New Zealand) and further, developing in some European civil law countries (Germany, 
Switzerland, Austria).”). 
 14 See, e.g., Michael G. Faure, Ton Hartlief & Niels J. Philipsen, Funding of Personal 
Injury Litigation and Claims Culture: Evidence from the Netherlands, 2 UTRECHT L. REV. 1, 
12 (2006) (describing domestic litigation in the Netherlands).  
[T]here are now, especially for handling personal injury claims, an increasing 
number of commercial legal assistance services on which victims may call. The 
advantage (from the victim’s perspective) is that these are not bound by legal eth-
ics and can thus usually work on a contingency or ‘no win no fee’ basis and also 
generally seem to do so. 
Id. 
 15 See, e.g., de Morpurgo, supra note 12, at 362–63, 365 (offering examples such as Bur-
ford Capital Limited, one of “the largest litigation-finance firms,” which “invests in commer-
cial litigation, ‘provid[ing] financing in support of significant corporate litigation, arbitration, 
and other disputes, working with clients in both the United States and internationally,’” and 
Allianz Prozessfinanzierung, which “has funded litigation costs to plaintiffs in Germany, 
Austria, and Switzerland, holding claims of at least €100,000, with a high probability of 
success and with a potentially divisible award that the company can share, in exchange for 20 
to 30% of the proceeds (if any).”) (alteration in original). 
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Both of these trends converged in the Ecuadorian litigation. The 
case was first filed in the U.S., then dismissed on the ground of forum non 
conveniens and refiled in Ecuador.16 The Ecuadorian part of the litigation 
was funded in part by the publicly traded firm Burford Capital, which “in-
vested $4 million in the Ecuadorians’ case against Chevron . . . in exchange 
for a 1.5% stake in any recovery, with the stated goal of increasing its out-
lay to $15 million, entitling it to a 5.5% share.”17 Originally, the funding 
agreement was subject to confidentiality restrictions. After plaintiffs’ coun-
sel discussed the funding agreement on film with the documentary 
filmmaker, however, a court found that the agreement’s privilege was 
waived, and it ordered the entire agreement to be disclosed.18 Burford then 
sold its interest to another party.19 At this time, the Ecuadorian court has 
ordered an $18 billion judgment, suggesting that the investment would yield 
between $270 million and $1 billion.20 However, the case is not yet final—
Chevron is currently appealing the judgment in Ecuador and simultaneously 
contesting judgment enforcement in the U.S.21 
  
 16 Mark Hamblett, Despite Old Ruling, Chevron Cleared to Challenge Ecuadorean 
Courts, N.Y.L.J. (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id= 
1202513294225&slreturn=1. 
 17 Parloff, supra note 7. 
 18 Id. 
 19 BURFORD CAPITAL LIMITED, BURFORD REPORTS CONTINUED ACTIVITY AND ENTRY INTO 
UK MARKET 4 (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.burfordfinance.com/docs/default-document-
library/burford_12de2011_rns_final.pdf. 
Burford provided $4 million of such financing to the law firm in November 2010, 
but sold a $4 million participation in the investment to a third party in December 
2010. Thus, Burford has no risk in the matter but does retain a residual interest in 
the outcome. Originally, the potential maximum financing commitment—at Bur-
ford’s option—was up to $15 million, and was included as such in the special situ-
ations portfolio. Further developments have led Burford to conclude that no further 
financing will be provided and thus decide to reduce the commitment level in the 
special situations portfolio accordingly. 
Id. 
 20 Id.  
According to Burford’s funding agreement, the deal goes like this: If Burford po-
nies up the full $15 million and the plaintiffs end up recovering $1 billion, Burford 
will get $55 million. If the plaintiffs recover $2 billion, Burford gets $111 million, 
and so on. But . . . [i]f the plaintiffs recover less than $1 billion . . . Burford would 
still get $55 million. 
Id. 
 21 Illegitimate Judgment Against Chevron in Ecuador Lawsuit: Chevron to Appeal in 
Ecuador, Enforcement Blocked by U.S. and International Tribunals, CHEVRON (Feb. 14, 
2011), http://www.chevron.com/chevron/pressreleases/article/02142011_illegitimatejudgmen 
tagainstchevroninecuadorlawsuit.news (“Chevron will appeal this decision in Ecuador and 
intends to see that justice prevails. United States and international tribunals already have 
taken steps to bar enforcement of the Ecuadorian ruling.”). 
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The funding agreement in the Ecuadorian litigation demonstrates 
how outside financing can shape litigation incentives at several levels, from 
individual litigant choices to international cooperation. The availability of 
outside funding may affect the initial decision to file suit, and it may change 
settlement incentives once suit is filed. Outside funding can also affect fo-
rum choice, potentially offsetting the traditional magnet effect in the U.S. 
and making it easier to maintain suit in other countries. These individual 
litigant incentives, in turn, affect the social and regulatory choices made at 
the national level. Likewise, these national choices affect countries’ interna-
tional cooperation and coordination in transnational litigation procedure. 
II. THE INTERNATIONAL GROWTH OF THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FINANCE 
Third-party funding for lawsuits was originally prohibited in feudal 
England, where the practice was referred to as “maintenance” (when the 
lawsuit was funded by a person who had no pre-existing relationship with 
the case) and “champerty” (when the maintenance was undertaken for prof-
it).22 At the time, such funding was viewed as detrimental to the developing 
legal system with little offsetting benefit. Feudal lords subsidized their sub-
jects’ litigation for both sport and profit, “underwrit[ing] suits against their 
enemies as a form of private warfare to weaken their opponent’s coffers.”23 
Furthermore, these feudal lords often took an interest in the real property at 
issue in the litigation, using their funding agreements to expand their hold-
ings and ultimately to consolidate land wealth in fewer hands.24 According 
to Blackstone, champerty thereby “pervert[ed] the process of law into an 
engine of oppression.”25 
Restrictions on champerty and maintenance traveled with English 
common law into the U.S. and gradually loosened over the subsequent cen-
turies. Early in the twentieth century, states created an exception to the tra-
ditional doctrine by allowing lawyers to charge contingency fees—a prac-
tice that was traditionally barred in England.26 The civil rights movement in 
  
 22 Jason Lyon, Comment, Revolution in Progress: Third-Party Funding of American Liti-
gation, 58 UCLA L. REV. 571, 579 (2010); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424–25 n.15 (1978) 
(“Put simply, maintenance is helping another prosecute a suit; champerty is maintaining a 
suit in return for a financial interest in the outcome.”). See generally Max Radin, Mainte-
nance by Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REV. 48 (1935) (discussing the concepts of maintenance and 
champerty with particular focus on their history).  
 23 Lyon, supra note 22, at 581. 
 24 See Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1287 (2011). 
 25 Thallhimer v. Brinckerhoff, 3 Cow. 623 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824). 
 26 Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 100 (2011) (“Courts 
and legislatures quickly found an exception to the restrictions on champerty such that by 
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the middle of the century further loosened restrictions, as the Supreme 
Court held that organizations such as the NAACP had a constitutional right 
to support litigation that furthered its aims, and could not be barred from 
providing such support by traditional rules against maintenance.27  
Even though England and Australia did not share in the same 
piecemeal exceptions to the doctrine—neither had a similar history of con-
tingent-fee litigation or widespread civil rights litigation—these countries 
were the first to abandon the old champerty and maintenance doctrines in 
favor of for-profit lawsuit investment.28 Litigation finance has been allowed 
at least to some degree for more than fifteen years in Australia.29 It expand-
ed even more after 2006, when the High Court of Australia gave its stamp 
of approval to third-party financing agreements in Campbells Cash & Carry 
v. Fostif. 30 The court held that not only could a third party finance the law-
suit, it could also retain a great deal of control over the lawsuit; it explicitly 
noted that “a person who hazards funds in litigation wishes to control the 
litigation is hardly surprising.”31 Litigation finance has grown rapidly since 
that 2006 decision, and indeed the financing companies are demanding a 
great deal of control over litigation strategy, including an option to with-
draw funding prior to termination of the case.32 At this time, there are sever-
al major litigation financing companies active in the Australian market, and 
two of the largest are publicly traded on the Australian Securities Ex-
change.33 Industry profits have also increased substantially.34 
Though not yet as robust as the Australian market for litigation 
funding, the litigation finance industry has also become relatively well es-
tablished in the jurisdiction of England and Wales, where the old prohibi-
  
1930, even in those states that strictly prohibited maintenance, a lawyer was permitted to 
‘invest’ in his client’s civil litigation.”). 
 27 Id. at 101 (“It can be taken as a given that, whatever a state might want to do with its 
maintenance law, it cannot, under the First Amendment, limit the power of laypersons to 
engage in selfless maintenance designed to protect constitutionally protected rights through 
litigation.”); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438–39 (1963). 
 28 See Parloff, supra note 7 (“England and Australia have embraced litigation financing 
even more enthusiastically than America has.”). 
 29 Lyon, supra note 22, at 590. 
 30 Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd. v. Fostif Pty Ltd. [2006] 229 CLR 386 (Austl.). 
 31 Id. para. 89, at 434 (Gummow, Hayne, and Crennan, JJ, concurring).  
 32 Lyon, supra note 22, at 602 (“[E]ven plaintiffs who retain nominal control of their suits 
will not make choices that are counter to the funder’s wishes.”). 
 33 Michael Legg et al., Litigation Funding in Australia 2 (Univ. of New S. Wales Law 
Research Series, Paper No. 12, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1579487. 
 34 Id. at 2–3 (“In the financial year ended 30 June 2009, IMF (Australia) Ltd received net 
income from litigation funding in the sum of $35,246,957, with total net income of 
$38,748,833. This represented a 21% increase in profitability from the previous year.”); see 
also Martin, supra note 11, at 107–08. 
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tion on maintenance and champerty was abolished by statute.35 Although 
contingency fees (lawyer-financed lawsuits) have not traditionally been 
permitted, “nonlawyer capital providers” may finance such suits “in ex-
change for a share of the recovery.”36 Additionally, as funding for legal aid 
has dried up in England, some “conditional fee” agreements similar to con-
tingency fees have also been allowed.37 Unlike the Australian system, third-
party financing providers in England and Wales do not typically take a con-
trolling role in litigation strategy.38 
The market for litigation funding in the U.S. is not yet as well estab-
lished as the markets in Australia and the U.K., but it is growing quickly.39 
The civil rights movement in the middle of the century was instrumental in 
changing public perceptions of litigation; lawsuits, once viewed as a neces-
sary evil, became seen as “a form of political expression” and an avenue by 
which the less powerful members of society could enforce their rights.40 
Given the political nature of legal services, some courts and legal scholars 
have suggested that outside investment—either in individual lawsuits or in 
law firms—may be constitutionally protected.41  
  
 35 Christopher Hodges, Stefan Vogenauer & Magdalena Tulibacka, Costs and Funding of 
Civil Litigation: A Comparative Study 28–29 (Dec. 2, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1511714 (citing Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990, c. 41, § 58 (U.K.); Access to 
Justice Act, 2000, § 27 (U.K.)). 
 36 Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99 
GEO. L.J. 65, 92 (2010). 
 37 Id.; see also Hodges et al., supra note 35, at 6 (“Governments are set to impose signifi-
cant cuts in public expenditure as a consequence of the financial environment, and civil 
justice is not a high priority for spending. . . . Legal aid is likely to remain largely unsustain-
able as a public expenditure item.”). 
 38 Molot, supra note 36, at 92 (“Funders generally do not control the course of litigation or 
unduly interfere with the attorney-client relationship.”). 
 39 Del Webb Communities, Inc. v. Partington, 652 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2011). 
The consistent trend across the country is toward limiting, not expanding, cham-
perty’s reach. Some states have squarely rejected tort claims based on champerty. 
Other states have refused to recognize champerty as anything more than a defense 
by a party to enforcement of the allegedly champertous agreement, implicitly re-
jecting a broader tort remedy. 
Id. 
 40 Stephen C. Yeazell, Brown, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Silent Litigation Revo-
lution, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1990 (2004). 
 41 See Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services: On the First 
Amendment Rights of Corporations and Individuals, OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (man-
uscript at 33), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1800258 
(“[C]ommercial speech about the delivery of legal services is inherently political speech, 
speech that goes to the heart of meaningful access to the law, speech deserving of the strong-
est of protection that the constitution offers.”); see also Balt. Scrap Corp. v. David J. Joseph 
Co., 237 F.3d 394, 401 (4th Cir. 2001) (“The First Amendment freedoms of petitioning and 
of association protect groups who for whatever reason want to contribute to a law-suit openly 
 
File: Robertson 2 Created on: 3/21/2012 3:41:00 PM Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:57:00 PM 
2011] THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FINANCING 167 
There is also strong political support for loosening traditional re-
strictions, with lobbyists in a number of states actively seeking liberalization 
of the lawsuit funding market.42 Thus, for example, when the Ohio Supreme 
Court reaffirmed traditional restrictions in champerty, the Ohio Legislature 
statutorily abolished the restriction very shortly thereafter.43 Currently, just 
over half of the states permit nonlawyer financing of lawsuits, and that 
number is growing.44 The leading position on litigation finance in the U.S. 
finds the traditional public policy justifications for prohibiting outside fi-
nancing to weigh less significantly than the importance of promoting access 
to justice.45 The trend toward acceptance of third-party funding may also 
grow in response to a diminution on public legal aid funding in the United 
States, which mirrors the funding crisis in England.46 
The changing cultural perception of litigation, the need for alternate 
funding sources to promote access to justice, and the political efforts to 
loosen restriction on lawsuit finance have combined with a larger deregula-
tion of financial products to create a significant market for litigation funding 
in the U.S.47 In 2010, it was estimated that the third-party litigation finance 
market in the U.S. was about $1 billion, with the bulk of the funding going 
  
or to stand apart from public view while another party files a lawsuit, assuming no rule or 
statute independently requires disclosure of the aid.”). 
 42 Binyamin Appelbaum, Lobby Battle Over Loans for Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 
2011, at B1 (“Since February, the industry’s allies have filed bills in New York and in at 
least four other states: Alabama, Kentucky, Indiana and Maryland. Legislators in Tennessee 
and Maryland have also introduced similar bills, but with somewhat stronger consumer pro-
tections.”). 
 43 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (West 2011) (superseding Rancman v. Interim Settle-
ment Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ohio 2003) (court assumes a thirty percent con-
tingency fee)); Stephen Gillers, Waiting for Good Dough: Litigation Funding Comes to Law, 
43 AKRON L. REV. 677, 682 (2010). 
 44 Sebok, supra note 26, at 98, 107 (listing twenty-eight states that permit maintenance, 
sixteen of which explicitly permit maintenance for profit). 
 45 See Gillers, supra note 43, at 689–92 (discussing the value of non-recourse advances 
and addressing counter-arguments).  
 46 See Hodges et al., supra note 35, at 6 (noting the reduction in funding for access to 
justice in England); Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 869, 870 (2009) (“Rising rates of foreclosures, bankruptcies, and unemploy-
ment create more needs for legal assistance among those least able to afford it. At the same 
time, resources for legal services providers cannot keep pace. . . .”); see also Erik Eckholm, 
Interest Rate Drop Has Dire Results for Legal Aid Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2009, at 
A12 (describing cuts to legal aid programs in the United States in the wake of the economic 
crisis). 
 47 Binyamin Appelbaum, Lawsuit Loans Add New Risk for the Injured, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
17, 2011, at A1 (“The business of lending to plaintiffs arose over the last decade, part of a 
trend in which banks, hedge funds and private investors are putting money into other peo-
ple’s lawsuits.”). 
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to relatively small cases.48 The American Bar Association’s Commission on 
Ethics 20/20 recently studied the growing market and warned that United 
States lawyers who assist their clients with litigation financing must take 
care to maintain “professional independence, candor, competence, undivid-
ed loyalty, and confidentiality” in client representation.49 
Although the litigation finance industry has grown on a global scale 
over the last decade, most litigation financing still occurs in single forum: 
U.S. companies financing small personal injury lawsuits in the U.S., for 
example, or Australian companies financing commercial litigation in Aus-
tralia.50 Burford Capital’s decision to finance transnational litigation in Ec-
uador is an exception to this trend, and it enters into a transnational arena 
where there is significant room for growth. Even in the well-developed Aus-
tralian market, observers have noted that foreign companies may profit from 
entering the market.51 But more importantly, there are a number of countries 
where litigation finance is permitted, but not yet commonly available. The 
profitable experience of companies in Australia, England, and the U.S.—
and their comfort in operating on a global scale—may spur the growth of 
litigation finance in other countries that permit litigation financing but do 
not have a well-developed litigation funding industry.52 Thus, countries 
such as Spain, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Bulgaria, Latvia, and Estonia may 
offer an untapped market for established companies looking to expand out 
of Australia, the U.K., or the U.S.53 Furthermore, this opportunity has not 
gone unnoticed by investment firms; Burford, for example, has expressed an 
interest in “expand[ing] its focus to other attractive and suitable jurisdic-
tions.”54  
  
 48 Binyamin Appelbaum, Putting Money on Lawsuits, Investors Share in the Payouts, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2010, at A1.  
 49 A.B.A. COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 12, at 41. 
 50 See Martin, supra note 11, at 107 (noting that funders have typically focused on smaller 
personal injury claims in the U.S. and larger commercial cases in Australia). 
 51 See Legg et al., supra note 33, at 42 (“It may also be the case that if litigation funding 
continues to result in significant returns that more entities, including those from outside of 
Australia, will enter the litigation funding market so as to be able to participate in those re-
turns.”). 
 52 See de Morpurgo, supra note 12, at 399 (“In the civil law world no specific legislative 
or judicial prohibitions seem to apply to [third-party litigation financing]. However, the 
industry is not developed.”).  
 53 Id. at 400 (“In all these countries, despite the absence of formal prohibitions, third-party 
funding of litigation is virtually nonexistent. . . . Because no prohibitions seem to apply, the 
reasons why [third-party litigation funding] has not developed in the civil law world are not 
clear.”). 
 54 BURFORD CAPITAL LIMITED, supra note 19, at 2. 
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III. THE ECONOMIC INCENTIVES OF LITIGATION FINANCE  
The tremendous global growth in third-party litigation over the last 
decade—and its projected expansion in the coming decade—will likely play 
a larger role in transnational litigation strategies in the near future. The 
availability of outside funding is likely to increase the number of lawsuits 
filed that involve parties from different countries. It is also likely to increase 
the settlement value of those cases. Third-party litigation finance may also 
influence where such lawsuits are filed, potentially offsetting the traditional 
magnet effect of the U.S. and increasing the number of viable forum choic-
es. Each of these factors will change the calculus of litigation expenses for 
transnational business, which may correspondingly shape business deci-
sions, regulatory choices, and even the development of substantive tort and 
business law. While it is impossible to predict how those changes will ulti-
mately develop, this section explores some of the possible ways in which 
litigation financing could affect transnational litigation and related legal 
developments. 
A.   Individual Incentives 
Most scholars who have examined the issue of investor financing 
agree that such financing will likely increase the total number of suits 
filed.55 Funding agreements, by supplying the upfront costs of the lawsuit, 
increase the probability that the plaintiff will be able to respond to private 
incentives to sue. Economic theory tells us that a plaintiff will likely file suit 
“when her expected benefit exceeds her litigation costs.”56 In mathematical 
terms, “a plaintiff will only file a claim if the expected value of the claim 
(the probability that the plaintiff will win, p, times the amount of recovery if 
it wins, w, less the costs of suit, c) is greater than zero.”57 Thus, the econom-
ic rationality of a plaintiff’s decision to file suit can be expressed by the 
equation “(p*w) – c > 0.”58  
Plaintiffs without available cash on hand cannot always afford to 
file suits even when the expected payment would make such a suit econom-
  
 55 See, e.g., id. at 384–85 (“[B]y increasing the funds available to claimholders to pursue 
litigation, [third-party litigation funding] would cause an increase in the overall number of 
claims . . . .”); see also Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Third-Party Financed Litigation 
(Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 11-57), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1971229 (“Third-party funding permits victims to transfer their claims to more efficient 
litigators, who would then prosecute these claims.”). 
 56 Dustin E. Buehler, Jurisdictional Incentives, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming Fall 
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1880975.  
 57 Whytock, supra note 8, at 487 n.25 (citing ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE 
ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 33–34 (2003)). 
 58 Id. 
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ically worthwhile; if they do not have cash on hand to pay litigation costs, 
they cannot file suit even when the expected recovery significantly out-
weighs litigation costs.59 Litigation financing, however, can enable plaintiffs 
to file suit when the economic incentives suggest that it may be worthwhile 
for them to do so by providing the up-front funding necessary. Litigation 
financing may not change the cost of filing suit, but it does change the time 
at which the plaintiff can access funds expected in litigation—and therefore 
allows the plaintiff to take advantage of an economically rational choice that 
might otherwise be out of reach. Once litigation is no longer artificially 
suppressed by the potential plaintiffs’ limited cash on hand, the number of 
suits filed is likely to grow.  
Litigation financing also goes further, however—in addition to 
changing the timing of costs, it also changes the expected values of other 
variables in the litigation equation. To the extent that financing companies 
also serve to provide the additional expertise that comes from being repeat 
players in the litigation market, the probability of winning may also in-
crease.60 Of course, the final element of the equation—the amount of the 
award—will also change with third-party financing, as the plaintiff will 
have a financial obligation to the funding company, and therefore a some-
what lower expected recovery. Depending on the strength of the repeat-
player advantage, the overall shift in incentives may spark an increase in 
litigation in excess of the increase caused by the change in timing of availa-
ble resources. Along with the increase in the number of lawsuits filed, there 
is likely to be a corresponding increase in the settlement value of those 
claims. The claims that went unfiled without third-party financing essential-
ly had a value of zero: because the aggrieved party could not afford to bring 
the claim, there was no cost for the potential defendant. In other cases, how-
ever, the plaintiff may have filed a claim but not had sufficient resources to 
pursue it to an economically efficient conclusion.61 In such a case, the de-
fendant could have settled the claim for significantly less than the plaintiff 
would have likely to been able to obtain at trial; effectively, the defendant 
  
 59 See Gillers, supra note 43, at 690. 
The plaintiff may be pressed by her financial predicament to take the advance, but 
without it she is pressed to sell her entire claim for less than her due, possibly far 
less. . . . In any event, the availability of litigation funding means she will be able 
to make a choice. 
Id. 
 60 Cf. Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 103–05 (1974) (describing the advantages of “repeat 
players” who are “engaged in many similar litigations over time” over “one-shotters” who 
“have only occasional recourse to the courts” and concluding that the “invention of new 
forms of institutional facilities” may offset some of these traditional advantages). 
 61 See Gillers, supra note 43, at 689–90.  
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may “buy” the plaintiff’s claim “for far less than market value.”62 Again, the 
availability of outside financing means that the plaintiff would have other 
options to obtain funds, thus alleviating the need to settle quickly—and the 
presence of more parties in the marketplace who can “buy” the claim means 
that there is likely to be economic competition, driving the price at which 
the plaintiff is willing to sell to a number closer to the amount recoverable 
through trial.63 
But while litigation funding is likely to increase the volume of liti-
gation and the settlement value of the cases filed, not all of the additional 
lawsuits will be meritorious. The litigation increase is not likely to come 
from frivolous suits, as most contracts permit only nonrecourse funding 
arrangements—if the plaintiff cannot obtain a recovery, the investor will not 
be paid.64 Nevertheless, there is still an economic incentive for a funder to 
invest in high-value claims that, while not frivolous, nevertheless have a 
low probability of actual recovery. If the expected value of a win is high 
enough, then even the low probability of such a win may spur investors to 
take a chance on funding the litigation.65 This analysis (that the break-even 
point can be measured by the dollar amount of expected recovery multiplied 
by the probability of recovery) is typically known as the “net present value,” 
“asset pricing,” or “discounted cash flow” model.66 Burford Capital’s in-
vestment in the Ecuadorian litigation may be an example of such high-risk 
funding that makes sense under a net present value model; given the enor-
mous Ecuadorian judgment, investment in the claim may be warranted even 
if there is a low probability of judgment enforcement. 
  
 62 Id. 
 63 Id.; see also Mariel Rodak, It’s About Time: A Systems Thinking Analysis of the Litiga-
tion Finance Industry and Its Effect on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 522 (2006) 
(“Since entering into a litigation finance contract presumably gives the plaintiff the resources 
and ‘threat credibility’ to carry her claim to trial, litigation financing may draw an otherwise 
obstinate defendant to the bargaining table and result in a fairer settlement award.”). 
 64 See de Morpurgo, supra note 12, at 384 (“The selection of cases by the financing com-
pany works as a ‘filter’ that leaves out frivolous and unmeritorious claims, in the same way 
attorneys working on a contingency basis do not accept cases that are not likely to be suc-
cessful.”) (citation omitted).  
 65 Id.  
For a risk neutral investor, the expected value of a $500 million claim with only a 
5% chance of success is equal to that of a $25 million claim with 100% probability 
to win. Because investors make their decision to invest based on the comparison 
between E(R) [expected revenue] and E(C) [expected cost], they might be attracted 
by highly risky (unmeritorious) claims with huge damage awards at stake. 
Id.; see also the litigation equation in the text accompanying note 55 (if the expected value of 
the recovery is high enough, than a litigant may rationally file suit even when the probability 
of winning is quite low). 
 66 Buehler, supra note 56, at 21; Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected 
Value of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1273 (2006). 
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Finally, by potentially raising the break-even point, outside financ-
ing of litigation may also reduce incentives to settle altogether in some cas-
es.67 As noted above, for example, the financing agreement in the Ecuadori-
an case would have provided Burford Capital with a base payment of $55 
million for any settlement of $1 billion or less.68 The plaintiffs, however, 
would have little incentive to settle for less than that amount, as one observ-
er has noted: 
In other words, if there were a $69.5 million recovery, Burford would still 
get $55 million, though that sum would, under the circumstances, consti-
tute almost 80% of the pot. In that event, by the way, the remaining 20% 
would not go to the plaintiffs; rather, it would go to other investors, who 
are also supposed to get their returns on investment (not just their capital 
outlays) before the plaintiffs start seeing a dime. In fact, under the “distri-
bution waterfall” set up by the 75-page contract, it is only after eight tiers 
of funders, attorneys, and “advisers” (including the plaintiffs’ e-discovery 
contractor) have fed at the trough that “the balance (if any) shall be paid to 
the claimants.”
69
 
With these flat-rate payments committed under the financing 
agreement, the plaintiffs would see so little of a recovery for any settlement 
less than $1 billion that they would be much less likely to settle for a lesser 
amount. By lowering the expected recovery to account for these repay-
ments, the financing agreement essentially raises the range within which the 
plaintiffs would be willing to negotiate a settlement.  
B.   Shifting Magnetic Polarities 
Litigation financing may also affect forum choice. As discussed 
above, the U.S. has traditionally been a magnet forum for transnational liti-
gation, due in part to its contingent fee tradition.70 When outside financing 
of litigation was unavailable, plaintiffs were often in a position to sue only 
if someone else could pay the cost of litigation up front—and, with contin-
gency fees, that option was typically available in the U.S., while rarely 
available elsewhere.  
Third-party financing may open new options for transnational liti-
gation, though it is unlikely to completely eliminate the magnetic effect of 
U.S. courts, as broad discovery rules and relatively high damage awards are 
  
 67 See Michael B. Abramowicz, A Fee Limitation Rule for Litigation Finance, Public 
Policy Roundtable on Third Party Financing of Litigation, at 29–30 (2009), available at 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/Abramowicz_Finance_Final.pdf (dis-
cussing scenarios that may affect a client’s ability to settle).  
 68 Parloff, supra note 7. 
 69 Id. 
 70 See sources cited supra note 8. 
File: Robertson 2 Created on: 3/21/2012 3:41:00 PM Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:57:00 PM 
2011] THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FINANCING 173 
still likely to maintain the courts’ attractiveness.71 Third-party financing is 
likely to make a difference in cases that U.S. courts refuse to hear, however, 
and may allow cases to be heard in a foreign forum after dismissal from a 
U.S. court. As noted above, U.S. courts are increasingly likely to dismiss 
cases under the doctrine of forum non conveniens when it appears that there 
is another forum able to hear the case. A large number of these cases in-
volve foreign plaintiffs and U.S. corporate defendants.72 In the past, cases 
dismissed from U.S. courts were rarely refiled abroad.73 Now, however, 
other countries are enacting procedures to make it easier for their nationals 
to refile such suits in their home forums.74 The growth of the litigation fi-
nance industry may work in tandem with these efforts, making it easier to 
claims for be filed in foreign forums—or even refiled after dismissal from a 
U.S. court. 
Courts in other countries may therefore begin to hear a larger pro-
portion of transnational lawsuits. It is difficult to predict which countries 
will get the most cases—and indeed, it may be that the litigation is spread 
out among a number of countries.75 While Australia, England, and the U.S. 
may have the largest number of litigation finance companies, a number of 
the companies are quite large, some even publicly traded, and they have the 
resources and ability to be comfortable operating internationally. Most other 
countries, even those that lack their own lawsuit-financing market, have few 
or no restrictions on investment from other companies. They may welcome 
international investment in litigation funding—especially when the plain-
tiffs who stand to benefit from the suit are residents, and the defendants 
  
 71 Beyond the instrumental reasons for choosing to file in the United States, plaintiffs may 
also find an “expressive” value in filing suit in the United States, especially in Alien Tort 
Statute actions against multinational, U.S.-based corporations. See Donald Earl Childress III, 
The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of International Law Litigation, 100 
GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=1815413) (“By alleging that a corporation is violating international law, plaintiffs sub-
ject corporations to brand damage while gaining significant publicity in hopes of both en-
couraging policy change and a monetary settlement.”). 
 72 See Robertson, supra note 2, at 1106–07. 
 73 David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: “A Rather 
Fantastic Fiction,” 103 L.Q. REV. 398, 418–20 (1987) (finding that only eighteen percent of 
personal injury plaintiffs and twenty percent of commercial plaintiffs re-filed cases abroad 
after forum non conveniens dismissals). 
 74 Robertson, supra note 2, at 1091–93 (discussing the demagnetizing movement proposed 
by American legal scholars).  
 75 See Whytock, supra note 8, at 486–87 (“From a simple rational choice perspective, [a 
litigant] will choose the court in which the expected value of her claim (less the costs of 
litigation) is the highest based on the substantive and procedural rules of that court's legal 
system.”). 
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potentially subject to a judgment are not.76 As a result, there may well be a 
global diffusion of transnational cases, with courts in a much larger number 
of countries regularly hearing cases involving foreign parties. 
C.   Social and Regulatory Impact 
The individual incentives for litigation suggest that the growth in 
litigation finance will increase the number of transnational cases filed and 
will broaden the number of countries in which those cases are heard. Be-
cause litigation finance changes the incentives for individual litigants, it will 
also have an effect on governmental social and regulatory incentives. The 
balance of regulation and litigation in individual countries will therefore 
change—and may thereby create incentives for greater international coordi-
nation of litigation procedures. 
1. Altering the balance of regulation and litigation 
Each country establishes its own balance of regulation and litigation 
to protect the public interest. In the United States, the balance has historical-
ly tilted more toward the litigation side, as the justice system has been used 
as a tool to vindicate civil rights,77 promote product safety,78 and punish 
wrongdoing through the award of punitive damages.79 In other countries, the 
balance has tilted more heavily toward regulation.80 
  
 76 Id. at 1127–28 (noting that a restrictive court-access doctrine in the United States “en-
courage[s] other countries to create mechanisms to hold U.S. corporations accountable for 
the harms they cause abroad—and, perhaps, to hold them accountable with much higher 
damages than they would face in the United States, and without U.S.-style due process pro-
tections.”). 
 77 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954); see also Symposium, 
Regulation through Litigation, 71 MISS. L.J. 613, 615–16 (2001) (“The Civil Rights move-
ment, for example, is one that is probably the prime example where you had stagnation in 
Congress, and you went to the courts and you ended up with major, major change.”). 
 78 See Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle, & Andrew Dorchak, Choosing How to Regulate, 
29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 181 (2005) (“Perhaps the best-known example of this new 
method of regulation is the 1998 settlement between the attorneys general of forty-six states 
and several major cigarette manufacturers.”). 
 79 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages As Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 
359 (2003) (“The prevailing justification for punitive damages is individually oriented, re-
tributive punishment.”); Thomas F. Burke, The Rights Revolution Continues: Why New 
Rights are Born (and Old Rights Rarely Die), 33 CONN. L. REV. 1259, 1260 (2001) 
(“[R]egulation by litigation has deep roots in the structure of American government and 
American political culture.”). 
 80 See Symposium, supra note 77, at 615 (“The Europeans and most folks do ex ante regu-
lation to take care of social reform. Litigation is expost.”). 
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Both regulation and litigation ultimately have a regulatory effect.81 
As a result, the balance between the two is essentially a matter of compara-
tive institutional choice, requiring the forum state to analyze how best to 
enforce societal goals and adopt corresponding policies that emphasize reg-
ulation and litigation to varying degrees.82 But while both regulation and 
litigation serve similar goals, they operate differently. Regulation occurs ex 
ante, as policymakers attempt to predict the risks of the regulated conduct 
and the incentives necessary to minimize those risks to the desired level.83 
By contrast, the regulatory effect of litigation necessarily occurs ex post.84 
Instead of predicting future risks, the harms from the challenged conduct 
can be quantified through litigation at trial. A more regulatory tilt thus al-
lows greater democratic participation in the evaluation of future risks and 
incentives,85 while a tilt toward litigation allows more accurate measure-
ment of harm, a more targeted remedy that focuses on the parties causing 
that harm, and a gradualist approach to changing incentives.86 
  
 81 See Eric A. Posner, Tobacco Regulation or Litigation?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1141, 1155 
(2003) (“Tort law is a form of regulation, and always has been.”); Kenneth S. Abraham, The 
Insurance Effects of Regulation by Litigation, in REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 212, 232 
(W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002) (“Ideally, the threat of civil liability has a regulatory effect by 
promoting optimal deterrence—the taking of precautions and selection of activities that 
minimize the sum of accident costs and accident avoidance costs.”); Edward T. Schroeder, 
Note, A Tort by Any Other Name? In Search of the Distinction Between Regulation Through 
Litigation and Conventional Tort Law, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 897, 899 (2005). 
Whether imposing civil liability for unreasonably dangerous product design or for 
medical care below the standard of the applicable medical community, tort law acts 
as a significant regulatory device by filling the gap between criminal behavior and 
socially advantageous behavior. In this sense, all tort litigation can be considered 
‘regulation through litigation. 
Id. 
 82 See Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort 
Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 728 (2007) (recommending factors to be included in the “com-
parative institutional analysis” of regulation and litigation). 
 83 See Posner, supra note 81, at 1155 (“[T]he policy here is to give manufacturers an ex 
ante incentive to invest in safety.”). 
 84 See Symposium, supra note 77, at 615. 
 85 See Schroeder, supra note 81, at 898 (“By avoiding traditional democratic processes, it 
is suggested that regulation through litigation provides a novel and subversive way of legis-
lating—allowing decisions to be made in secret settlement negotiations, rather than through 
public congressional debate or the administrative comment process.”). 
 86 See Dru Stevenson, Judicial Incrementalism: A Reply To Professor Sunstein, 34 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 191, 221 n.116 (2008) (“[T]he case-by-case litigation method, with all its at-
tendant evidentiary restrictions, jury ballots, and the checks and balances of the adversarial 
system, will mean more gradual management of public risks than command-and-control 
regulation by administrative agencies, which is clearly the inevitable alternative.”). 
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A global increase in transnational litigation may destabilize the 
equilibrium between regulation and litigation in individual countries.87 This 
destabilization may lead to changes in the substantive law, which is predi-
cated on a certain expected level of litigation and regulatory cost.88 It is dif-
ficult to predict what such substantive changes would look like; depending 
on the nature of the litigation and the public policy of the state, substantive 
responses could go in a variety of opposing directions.  
First, litigation may increase in areas where there has been regulato-
ry failure or inaction. In these cases, litigation may serve to reveal addition-
al information about the defendant’s conduct in a way that drives public 
opinion toward increasing regulation in the area as well, thus resulting in an 
overall increase in both regulation and litigation in the subject area.89 We 
may be seeing an example of this phenomenon in the Ecuadorian litigation. 
Defendants in the lawsuit argued that the environmental practices that con-
taminated the Amazon were in fact allowed by the government, which had 
allegedly weighed the cost of possible environmental harm against the bene-
fit of foreign investment and oil development.90 The litigation itself, howev-
  
 87 Cf. Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. 
L. REV. 1055, 1102 (1997).  
[A] given regulatory context can be viewed as a legal equilibrium and described as 
stable or unstable based on its response to a disturbance. If legal treatment of an is-
sue is in a state of stable equilibrium, the legal regime is not readily changed 
through small or incremental shifts in political forces—the type of shifts associated 
with evolutionary legal change. . . . 
Changes in legal rules can be expected in an unstable legal equilibrium, by con-
trast, because of its inherent potential for change. 
Id. 
 88 Catherine T. Struve, Procedure as Palimpsest, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 421, 438 (2010).  
For example, a country in which public enforcement of certain types of legal obli-
gations is relatively strong may rely less on private enforcement of such obliga-
tions and that balance may help to explain features that restrict private litigants’ 
access to the courts to litigate such claims. . . . [I]n some foreign countries this bal-
ance may be shifting, in the sense that some countries outside the United States are 
in fact experimenting with an expansion of their use of private suits to supplement 
governmental regulation. 
Id. 
 89 See, e.g., Timothy D. Lytton, Using Tort Litigation to Enhance Regulatory Policy Mak-
ing: Evaluating Climate-Change Litigation in Light of Lessons from Gun-Industry and Cler-
gy-Sexual-Abuse Lawsuits, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1837, 1876 (2008) (analyzing the influence of 
tort litigation on regulatory policy making); Wagner, supra note 82, at 729 (concluding that 
litigation can increase the information available about defendants’ practices and the risks 
created by those practices). 
 90 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“On any fair view 
of the evidence so far adduced in this case, the alleged preference given by the Consortium to 
oil exploitation over environmental protection was a conscious choice made by the Govern-
ment of Ecuador in order to stimulate its economy.”). 
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er, has brought significant public attention to the environmental harm 
caused by oil extraction in the Amazon—and may have spurred some of the 
more recent environmental law choices, including constitutional amend-
ments that explicitly rely on both regulation and litigation to protect envi-
ronmental interests.91 
Second, litigation may increase in areas where there has not been 
regulatory failure, but where litigation satisfies policy goals more effective-
ly than direct regulation. For example, economic theory suggests that in-
creased levels of litigation can lead to increased product safety, as manufac-
turers are then required to internalize the costs of the harms caused by their 
product.92 When goods are sold only in a single country, that nation’s regu-
latory policy probably affects product safety much more than the level of 
litigation affects it.93 When goods are sold internationally, however, these 
domestic regulatory forces may be less effective. Essentially, product manu-
facturers can offset higher litigation costs in some countries with lower 
costs in others—and can thereby avoid internalizing the full cost of the inju-
ries attributable to the product.94 Litigation may therefore do more to 
achieve product safety for goods sold globally.  
When litigation complements existing regulatory policy, an increase 
in transnational litigation may have a substitutionary effect. Governments 
may come to rely less on regulatory policy and more on judicial remedies to 
address social needs. The United States, for example, has historically of-
fered a higher level of compensatory damages to tort victims than other 
countries have provided—but this has been offset by a lesser social safety 
net.95 If litigation financing offers opportunities to increase the number of 
  
 91 There is skepticism, however, about whether the new constitutional guarantees will be 
enforced in practice. Mary Elizabeth Whittemore, The Problem of Enforcing Nature’s Rights 
Under Ecuador’s Constitution: Why the 2008 Environmental Amendments Have No Bite, 20 
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 659, 660 (2011) (“[T]he new articles grant the environment the inal-
ienable right to exist, persist, regenerate, and be respected. They also guarantee Ecuadorean 
citizens the right to sue for enforcement of these rights.”). 
 92 See Buehler, supra note 56, at 20 (“[P]roducts liability forces manufacturers to internal-
ize the full cost of harm caused by unsafe products, providing an incentive for those manu-
facturers to take precautions that reduce product risk.”). 
 93 See id. at 20 n.108 (“[M]arket forces and government regulation provide adequate in-
centives for manufacturers to address well-publicized product risks.”). 
 94 See Robertson, supra note 2, at 1109 (arguing that, when a certain harmful product is 
also available in the American market, the United States has an incentive in deterring the sale 
of that harmful product abroad, thereby reducing the presence of harmful products on the 
global market); Elizabeth T. Lear, National Interests, Foreign Injuries, and Federal Forum 
Non Conveniens, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 559, 574 (2007) (“[P]roducers operating in global 
markets may be able to avoid internalizing all of the costs imposed on others by their prod-
uct, which in turn skews economic incentives to make the product or activity safer.”). 
 95 Robertson, supra note 2, at 1110–11 (“Damage awards in the United States are higher 
than in other countries, in part because U.S. damage awards must substitute for the social 
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transnational cases, then other countries may follow the lead of the United 
States, and may reduce public spending in favor of private litigation.96 This 
substitutionary effect may be especially strong in lawsuits involving domes-
tic plaintiffs and foreign defendants, as successful litigation would bring 
additional financial resources into the country, potentially offsetting gov-
ernmental expenditures.97    
Finally, however, litigation may also increase in areas where there 
has not been regulatory failure—and where, instead, the regulatory balance 
was carefully crafted and effectively functioning. In these situations, litiga-
tion is likely to be less welcomed by the government, and will instead be 
“perceived as being at odds with legislative or administrative policy mak-
ing.”98 When litigation conflicts with regulatory policy choices, it may spur 
preemptive legislation rather than complementary regulation, “provok[ing] 
a backlash in the form of immunity legislation, [and] foreclosing the poten-
tial contribution of litigation to policy experimentation.”99 
2. Coordination of litigation procedures  
As noted above, an increase in transnational litigation, sparked by 
the greater availability of outside financing, could have significant effects 
on the substantive and regulatory policy choices made by individual gov-
ernments. However, the nature of those changes depends on whether the 
new lawsuits complement regulatory policy, substitute for it, or conflict 
with it. Although individual countries must strike their own balance based 
on domestic policy, the effects of these decisions will be felt globally.
100
 
When aggregated, individual nations’ regulatory changes will have an effect 
on countries’ interrelationships and on global governance more broadly.101 
As a result, litigation finance may incentivize greater international coopera-
  
safety net that exists in a number of other countries. In many countries, lower damage awards 
are offset by government-funded health care and other benefits.”); Julius Jurianto, Forum 
Non Conveniens: Another Look at Conditional Dismissals, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 369, 
404 (2006) (“The possibility to obtain larger damages in the United States is also due to the 
fact that the amount of the damage award is likely to be keyed to the higher living standards 
but lower social safety net in the United States.”). 
 96 See Struve, supra note 88. 
 97 See sources cited and text accompanying supra note 8. 
 98 Lytton, supra note 89, at 1876. 
 99 Id. 
100 Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance, 84 TUL. L. REV. 67, 
118 (2009) (“[T]he global governance functions of domestic courts are important not only 
because of their impact on litigants, but also—and perhaps even more importantly—because 
of their influence beyond the parties to particular lawsuits and beyond state borders.”). 
101 See id. at 74 (“[A] wide variety of institutions—domestic and international, public and 
private, formal and informal—make critical contributions to global governance.”). 
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tion in transnational litigation procedures such as forum choice and judg-
ment enforcement. 
As discussed above, the availability of litigation financing may de-
crease the United States’ magnet effect for litigation. If transnational litiga-
tion truly becomes multipolar,102 U.S. courts may take steps to bring trans-
national lawsuits back to the U.S.—especially in cases against U.S. defend-
ants. Right now, U.S. defendants often file forum non conveniens motions to 
seek dismissal from U.S. courts in favor of an alternate forum. Typically 
these defendants do not actually want to litigate abroad; instead, they are 
essentially bluffing, betting on plaintiffs’ inability to follow through with 
suit elsewhere.103 Thus, for example, it may have been a reasonable litiga-
tion strategy for Robinson Helicopter to move for a forum non conveniens 
dismissal from a U.S. court in favor of a Chinese forum, as it did in one 
recent case.104 When the plaintiffs refiled the case in China, however, Rob-
inson Helicopter did not appear for trial—it is quite possible that the com-
pany had never expected to have to defend the case abroad and was unpre-
pared to do so. 
The demagnetization of U.S. courts may encourage greater interna-
tional cooperation in setting guidelines for forum selection. Courts in the 
United States have historically granted dismissal with little scrutiny, though 
other countries have objected to this practice insofar as its limits their citi-
zens’ ability to bring suit in the U.S. against U.S. defendants.105 Although a 
lenient forum non conveniens practice may save administrative costs and 
may protect U.S. corporate defendants in the short run, the calculation 
changes significantly if more cases go to trial abroad.106 Defendants are 
likely to be much more comfortable litigating at home with familiar due 
process protections107 rather than litigating abroad in an unfamiliar envi-
ronment, and they may therefore support a more open court-access policy 
than they would have in the past. If this were to happen, we would see 
  
102 See generally Marcus S. Quintanilla & Christopher A. Whytock, The New Multipolarity 
in Transnational Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign Judgments, and Foreign Law, 17 SW. 
J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1874370 (predicting 
that transnational litigation will become increasingly multipolar over the next decade). 
103 Robertson, supra note 9, at 418–20 (finding that few cases dismissed from U.S. courts 
were subsequently re-filed abroad). 
104 Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc., 2009 WL 
2190187, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2009). 
105 Robertson, supra note 2, at 1091–94. 
106 See generally Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1. 
107 Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding that many 
countries have “fundamentally fair” judicial systems, even though “[i]t is a fair guess that no 
foreign nation has decided to incorporate our due process doctrines into its own procedural 
law . . . .”). 
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plaintiffs’108 and defendants’ interests converge on a U.S. forum in a man-
ner that could raise the global influence of U.S. procedural innovations and 
protections.109 
A global increase in litigation finance—and concomitant increase in 
transnational litigation, spread among a large number of countries—may 
also promote international coordination on cross-border judgment enforce-
ment.110 The plaintiff’s ability to enforce a judgment is very important in 
transnational litigation; without the ability to enforce the resulting judg-
ment, there is little incentive to take the case to trial in a given forum.111 In 
many cases, enforcement is not a problem even when the plaintiff must en-
force the judgment in a different country than the rendering forum; the 
global norm leans toward enforcement of foreign judgments, and most 
countries—perhaps especially the U.S.—have been very open to judgment 
enforcement generally.112 But even though judgment enforcement may be 
  
108 As noted above, plaintiffs have several reasons to prefer a U.S. forum, including greater 
discovery, higher damage awards, as well as the “expressive” interest in politically sensitive 
cases. See Childress, supra note 71. 
109 See Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 441, 470–71 (2010) (arguing that by moving toward convergence in pleading, “Ameri-
ca might be able to export U.S. procedural law and norms abroad” and noting that “[t]he 
trends [toward procedural convergence] provide the opportunity for America to make a posi-
tive impact on the development of global procedural norms instead of perennially being 
contrasted with them.”); Robertson, supra note 2, at 1117 (“As more foreign plaintiffs 
choose to sue in the United States, appreciation for American due process protections may 
grow, and other court systems may integrate familiar U.S. procedures that are perceived to 
work well.”). 
110 International cooperation may be especially likely if internal changes due to increased 
litigation funding create significant domestic pressure for reform. See, e.g., Pierre-Hugues 
Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 115 
(2009). 
[D]omestic constraints on the autonomy of regulators, while ensuring some degree 
of accountability, cast doubt on the purported insulation of the regulators from the 
domestic political pressures that make formal international agreements difficult to 
reach. . . . As a result, national regulators acting in [transnational regulatory net-
works] are not free to pursue optimal global public policy for its own sake. Instead, 
one should expect that their positions will be shaped by the preferences of domes-
tic constituencies. 
Id. 
111 See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 1, at 1462 (describing the judgment enforcement 
doctrine in the United States). 
112 Id.; Linda J. Silberman, The Impact of Jurisdictional and Recognition Practice on In-
ternational Business Transactions: The U.S. Regime, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 327, 352 (2004) 
(“In general, recognition and enforcement of foreign country judgments in the United States 
has tended to be much more generous than the treatment given by foreign courts to U.S. 
judgments.”); Samuel P. Baumgartner, How Well Do U.S. Judgments Fare in Europe?, 40 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 173, 230 (2008). 
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more common than not, there are enough exceptions to enforceability to 
cause real problems in transnational litigation.113 And while there have been 
efforts to negotiate a judgment enforcement treaty, negotiations ultimately 
stalled.114 
A more globalized network of litigation investors might revitalize 
such negotiations, however. Each country has an interest in seeing its judg-
ments enforced. If more countries are deciding transnational cases, then 
there will be more countries with a stake in predictable judgment enforce-
ment procedures. As a result, there may be greater incentives to work out 
the difficulties that have stymied treaty negotiations in the past, and to come 
up with workable solutions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Third-party litigation finance is a growing industry. The market for 
lawsuit investment is already quite large in Australia, the U.K., and the 
U.S., and it is poised for growth worldwide. At this point, it is difficult to 
predict how the growth of this market will affect transnational litigation. It 
seems likely that the number of transnational lawsuits filed will grow, that 
the settlement values of those lawsuits will increase, and that the lawsuits 
may be spread out among a larger number of countries than was typical in 
the past. If and when this increase in litigation comes to pass, investor-
financed lawsuits may also have an impact on the substantive regulatory 
choices of individual countries and may induce greater international coordi-
nation on both regulatory policies and on issues of international litigation 
procedure, including forum choice and cross-border judgment enforcement. 
  
[W]hether U.S. judgments fare better, the same, or worse in Europe than do Euro-
pean judgments in the United States depends on a number of factors—the country, 
the subject matter, the relief granted, the closeness of the dispute to the recognition 
country, and, in some instances, on who the defendant was in the American pro-
ceedings—among others. 
Id. 
113 See Baumgartner, supra note 112, at 174–75. 
114 Id. at 175–77; see also Robertson, supra note 2, at 1126 (noting that the proposed 
Hague Judgment Convention failed before adoption, and a less ambitious choice-of-court 
convention was adopted instead). Although the United States has signed the choice-of-court 
convention, it has not yet ratified it. Status Table: Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of 
Court Agreements, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php? 
act=conventions.status&cid=98 (last updated Nov. 19, 2010). 
